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The recent run-ups in oil and other commodity prices and their implications for infla-
tion and monetary policy have grabbed the attention of many commentators in the  
media. Clearly, higher prices of food and energy end up in the broadest measures  
of consumer price inflation, such as the Consumer Price Index. Since the mid-1980s, 
however, sharp increases and decreases in commodity prices have had little, if any, 
impact on core inflation, the measure that excludes food and energy prices. 
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We study the influence of  
a credible inflation-fighting 
central bank by comparing 
responses of core inflation 
and the monetary policy  























































































































Notes: The blue lines are 68% posterior probability bands. CRB indicates Commodity Research Bureau; PCE indicates 
personal consumption expenditures. 
source: Authors' calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.
A. Core PCE inflation, pre-Volcker
basis points
B. Federal funds rate, pre-Volcker
basis points
C. Core PCE inflation, post-Volcker (to 2008:Q4)
basis points
D. Federal funds rate, post-Volcker (to 2008:Q4)
basis points 
  2. Responses to oil price shocks 
Notes: The blue lines are 68% posterior probability bands. CRB indicates Commodity Research Bureau; PCE indicates 
personal consumption expenditures. 
source: Authors' calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.
A. Core PCE inflation, pre-Volcker
basis points
B. Federal funds rate, pre-Volcker
basis points
C. Core PCE inflation, post-Volcker (to 2008:Q4)
basis points
D. Federal funds rate, post-Volcker (to 2008:Q4)
basis points 
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on a limited set of results, our findings 
appear to be quite robust.7
Findings
The median dynamic responses of in-
flation and FFR to these identified shocks 
are displayed in figures 1 and 2 for the 
CRB shock and oil shock, respectively. 
These plots display the predicted quar-
terly time paths of inflation and the FFR 
following an unanticipated increase in 
CRB prices of 3% and oil prices of 10%, 
implied by our estimated VAR and iden-
tification scheme.8 The blue lines rep-
resent 68% posterior probability bands, 
a measure of our uncertainty in the  
estimated paths. Panels A and B of the 
figures show estimates based on the pre-
Volcker sample, 1959:Q1 to 1979:Q2, 
and panels C and D show estimates based 
on the post-Volcker sample, 1982:Q3 to 
2008:Q4. 
In the pre-Volcker period, core inflation 
rises significantly following an unantici-
pated increase in CRB commodity prices 
(figure 1, panel A). This occurs despite 
a significant reaction of the FFR to the 
same CRB shock (panel B). In the 
post-Volcker period, 
the same size CRB 
shock leads to virtually 
no change in inflation 
(panel C). Whatever 
is driving the non- 
response of inflation 
in the post-Volcker 
period, it does not 
appear to be an ag-
gressive response  
of monetary policy—
the FFR response 
(panel D) is a small 
fraction of the reac-
tion in the earlier 
period. 
In figure 2, the re-
sponses to the oil 
shock follow a broadly 
similar pattern. In the 
pre-Volcker sample, 
core inflation and the 
FFR respond by a rel-
atively large amount 
to the oil shock, al-
though the statistical 
significance of the 
FFR response is marginal. In the post-
Volcker period, the core inflation re-
sponse is virtually zero. Some case may 
be made here that the non-response of 
inflation is in part due to monetary 
policy reacting to the oil shock (figure 2, 
panel D). However, we discount this in-
terpretation because the magnitude of 
the response is tiny—a surprise increase 
in oil prices of 10% at best merits a rise 
in the FFR of only 10 basis points. 
In sum, figures 1 and 2 provide some 
evidence for the “weak central bank 
credibility” hypothesis during the pre-
Volcker period. In the post-Volcker era, 
neither core inflation nor monetary 
policy has been very sensitive to surprises 
in commodity prices, consistent with the 
“uninformative indicator” hypothesis.
Finally, we quantify the effects that re-
cent oil and CRB shocks should have 
on policy according to the estimated 
policy rules. The fact that we’ve been 
constrained by the zero lower bound 
(i.e., FFR close to zero) makes this  
exercise problematic. The estimated 
rules clearly do not hold in a period 
when the bound comes into play. How-
ever, to get at least a rough idea of the 
importance of commodity prices for 
monetary policy in the current period, 
we conducted a dynamic simulation  
of the post-Volcker rule, ignoring the 
existence of the zero lower bound.9
Figure 3 shows the actual path of the 
FFR since 2005:Q1 (blue line), along 
with the values predicted by our esti-
mated post-Volcker monetary policy 
rule for 2009:Q1 forward (black line) 
and a version of this policy rule that 
excludes commodity prices (light blue 
line). The predicted values for FFR  
are from simulations in which variables 
other than FFR are set at their realized 
values, but FFR is determined dynami-
cally.10 The last data point is for 2011:Q1, 
and was fitted based on our own esti-
mates for GDP and core PCE inflation 
and the commodity and oil prices in 
that quarter.11 
If we focus on the policy rule that in-
cludes commodity prices, after 2008:Q4 
the fitted funds rate quickly goes nega-
tive, reaching as low as –2.66% in 2009, 
whereas actual policy is constrained by 
the zero lower bound. The predicted 
policy rate gradually rises as data on 
3. Recent monetary policy and commodity prices 
Note: FFR indicates federal funds rate. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Haver Analytics.
A. Actual FFR and predicted by post-Volcker rules
B. Recent oil and non-oil commodity prices
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2006 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10GDP growth improved in late 2009 and 
2010, reaching 1.15% for the current 
quarter. It is important to note that the 
policy rule depends on growth rates and 
contains no GDP or inflation gap vari-
ables. In this respect it is not a tradition-
al Taylor rule.
The most important point to take away 
from figure 3 is that the difference be-
tween the policy rules with and with-
out commodity prices is quite small, 
averaging only 40 basis points over the 
period. Even with the very large run-up 
in oil and CRB shown in the bottom 
panel of figure 3, estimated policy rules 
from the post-Volcker period do not 
suggest a large response of policy.
Conclusion
The modest dependence of policy on 
energy and other commodity prices 
implied by our analysis is not surprising. 
The shares of firm costs accounted for 
by energy and commodities are not large 
and, in fact, have fallen over time. 
Moreover, at least in the case of oil, 
price increases tend to slow the econo-
my even without any policy rate increases. 
Of course, if commodity and energy 
prices were to lead to a general expec-
tation of a broader increase in inflation, 
more substantial policy rate increases 
would be justified. But assuming there 
is a generally high degree of central-
bank credibility, there is no reason for 
such expectations to develop—in fact, 
in the post-Volcker period, there have 
been no signs that they typically do. 
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